66 ideas
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 21181 | Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh] |
| 21183 | Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh] |
| 21191 | Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh] |
| 21199 | Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh] |
| 21189 | Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh] |
| 21180 | Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh] |
| 21182 | Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh] |
| 21184 | Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh] |
| 21187 | Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh] |
| 21185 | Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh] |
| 21194 | The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh] |
| 21195 | In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh] |
| 21197 | Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh] |
| 21188 | Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh] |
| 21186 | Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh] |
| 21192 | Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh] |
| 21196 | To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh] |
| 21190 | 'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh] |
| 21193 | The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh] |
| 21198 | If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh] |